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TOWARDS THE CRIMINALIZATION OF
DICTATORSHIP: A DRAFT PROPOSAL FOR
AN INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION
ON DICTATORSHIP
Patrick J. Glent
I. INTRODUCTION
The history of the 20th century has in large part been defined by
atrocities and the international community's reaction to their commission.
In the wake of the Holocaust and other Nazi atrocities committed during
World War Two, the Allies established the International Military Tribunal,'
along with other regional courts, to try the offenders. More generally, the
expansive destruction wrought by the Second World War led to the estab-
lishment of the United Nations (U.N.). 2 Almost immediately the U.N. be-
gan formulating comprehensive treaties to protect individuals and the
community at large from the possibility of a similar chain of events occur-
ring in the future. These instruments included the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights,' the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (Genocide Convention), 4 and the four Geneva Conven-
tions dealing with the treatment of certain persons during armed conflict.
5
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I Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Agreement for the Prosecution
and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis (London Agree-
ment), Aug. 8, 1945, 58 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 280.
2 Charter of the United Nations, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, 3 Bevans 1153.
3 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810
at 71 (1948).
4 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec.
9. 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
5 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31;
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Despite this framework, people continued to die in large numbers under
oppressive totalitarian regimes. Millions were killed in Soviet Russia under
Stalin, 6 in China during the communization of the economy and Cultural
Revolution, 7 in the killing fields of Cambodia,8 and in various states on the
African continent. 9 Periodically, the international community responded
with further treaties attempting to remedy the oppressive treatment of per-
sons throughout the world. These conventions and covenants, including the
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR), 10 the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR), 11 the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Torture Convention), 12 the Interna-
tional Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimina-
tion,' 3 and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women, 14 represent the foundation of modern
human rights law. Most recently, following the establishment of the Inter-
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75
U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,
Aug. 12 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75
U.N.T.S. 287.
6 See Charles P. Trumbull IV, Giving Amnesties a Second Chance, 25 BERKELEY
J. INT'L L. 283, 284 (2007).
7 David B. Kopel, Lethal Laws, 15 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 355, 365-66
(1995) (book review).
8 Theresa Klosterman, The Feasibility and Propriety of a Truth Commission in
Cambodia: Too Little? Too Late?, 15 ARIz. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 833, 850 (1998).
9 See, e.g., Sani Abacha (Nigeria), Ahmadou Ahidjo (Cameroon), Idi Amin
(Uganda), Hastings Banda (Malawi), Samuel Doe (Liberia) and Milton Obote
(Uganda).
10 Int'l Covenant on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200(A), U.N.
GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc A/6316 (1966).
11 Int'l Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200(A), U.N. GAOR,
21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
12 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, Annex, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at
197, U.N. Doc. A/39/51/Annex (1984).
13 Int'l Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Jan.
4,1969, 660 U.N.T.S. 195.
1' Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Wo-
men, G.A. Res. 34/180 at 193, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess. Supp. No. 46, U.N. Doc. A/
34/46, (Sept. 3, 1981).
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national Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 15 and the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 16 there has been a push to establish an
International Criminal Court (I.C.C.). This was achieved when the Rome
Statute of the I.C.C. (Rome Statute) 17 entered into force in July 2002. The
I.C.C. represents a temporary culmination in the codification of interna-
tional crimes. The crimes over which the court has jurisdiction are geno-
cide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression.
18
The nature of these crimes requires the Court to look at the act itself. The
only question is whether the elements of each are present.
Yet with history as a teacher and the trial and execution of Saddam
Hussein in the forefront of the international consciousness, some are begin-
ning to look at who commits these crimes. To this end, some have begun to
call for the criminalization of "dictatorship."' 19 The evidence of the 20th
century strongly points to dictators as the hub of strife and human rights
violations. In 2005, Congress noted the strong "correlation between non-
democratic rule and other threats to international peace and security, includ-
ing [threats from] war, genocide, famine, poverty, drug trafficking, corrup-
tion, refugee flows, human trafficking, religious persecution, environmental
degradation, and discrimination against women. '20 Testifying before the
House International Relations Committee that drafted the above language,
former Ambassador to Hungary Mark Palmer went beyond simply drawing
a correlation between totalitarian rule and widespread abuses, stating "the
20th century was the bloodiest in human history because dictators made it
15 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia, S.C. Res. 1166,
U.N. Doc. S/Res/1166 (May 13, 1998).
16 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 995, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994).
17 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. 1998, A/CONF.
183/9 (July 1, 2002).
18 Id. at Article 5(1)(a) - (d). Under Article 5(2), the Court will exercise jurisdic-
tion over the crime of aggression only once it has been defined in accordance with
articles 121 and 123 of the Statute.
19 See Chris J. Bakwesegha, The Organization of African Unity and the Democra-
tization Process in Africa: Lessons Learned, UN-NGLS: VoicEs FROM AFRICA,
http://www.un-ngls.org/documents/publications.en/voices.africa/number8/3bakwe
se.htm.
20 HENRY J. HYDE, ADVANCE DEMOCRACY ACT OF 2005, H.R. REP. 108-168,
§ 602(3) (2005).
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So.''21 Although a survey of the world's remaining dictators would expose
wide variation in religious belief, political ideology, ethnicity and national-
ity, they all share a "willingness to use such weapons as they have, whether
machetes or canisters of lethal chemical agents, against all enemies, real
and imagined, foreign and domestic. Under their stony gaze, millions upon
millions have gone to their deaths, a great tide of refugees has swept across
the planet, and promising nations have been driven into poverty, famine,
and despair. ' 22 It is time for these abuses to end.
The actual mechanism to be put into place, however, is the subject
of considerable debate. There are certainly options available, from
criminalizing dictatorship under domestic law to trying to fit it within ex-
isting categories of crimes against humanity. One of the most obvious ways
to achieve this criminalization, and the subject of the present article, is
through an international convention. Part II of this article will focus on the
problems inherent in trying to fit dictatorship under the prevailing defini-
tions of international criminal law. As such an attempt is steeped in diffi-
culty and is, furthermore, not the definitive action needed, this article
proceeds in Part III by presenting proposed draft articles that an interna-
tional convention would need to include. These articles will include a defi-
nition of dictatorship, a list of the acts and circumstances under which
punishment may accrue to the offender, a statement abrogating head of state
immunity as a defense to prosecution, and jurisdictional articles delineating
who may prosecute and where that prosecution may take place. Following
each proposed article will be commentary explaining why the language was
drafted as it was.
II. CAN DICTATORSHIP FALL UNDER EXISTING DEFINITIONS OF
INTERNATIONAL CRIMES?
As noted in Part I, perhaps the simplest way to begin punishing
dictatorship would be to try and fit it within existing definitions of interna-
tional crimes. This section explores that possibility and ultimately comes to
the conclusion that such an absorption into existing law would not be par-
ticularly efficacious. Using the Rome Statue as the definitional guideline,
the four crimes over which that court has jurisdiction will be examined, in
21 Promoting Democracy Through Diplomacy, Hearing Before the House Com-
mittee on International Relations, 109th Cong. 37 (2005) (prepared statement of the
Hon. Mark Palmer, President and CEO, Capitol Development Company).
22 MARK PALMER, BREAKING THE REAL AXIS OF EVIL: How TO OUST THE
WORLD'S LAST DICTATORS BY 2025 2 (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2003)
(1991).
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turn, to determine whether they could support within them the crime of
dictatorship.
A. Aggression
Jurisdiction over aggression is granted to the I.C.C. pursuant to arti-
cle 5(1)(d) of the Court's statute. Although a definition of the crime has not
been agreed upon for purposes of the Court,23 any definition finally agreed
upon would most likely mirror or include many of the same elements as the
definition adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1974.24 Ar-
ticle 1 of that resolution defines aggression as "the use of armed force by a
State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence
of another State, or in any manner inconsistent with the Charter of the
United Nations, as set out in this Definition. ' 25 Article 3 delineates certain
acts that will qualify as aggression under the resolution:
(a) The invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State
of the territory of another State, or any military occu-
pation, however temporary, resulting from such inva-
sion or attack, or any annexation by the use of force of
the territory of another State or part thereof;
(b) Bombardment by the armed forces of a State against
the territory of another State or the use of any weap-
ons by a State against the territory of another State;
(c) The blockade of the ports or coasts of a State by the
armed forces of another State;
(d) An attack by the armed forces of a State on the land,
sea or air forces, or marine and air fleets of another
State;
(e) The use of armed forces of one State which are within
the territory of another State with the agreement of the
receiving State, in contravention of the conditions pro-
vided for in the agreement or any extension of their
presence in such territory beyond the termination of
the agreement;
(f) The action of a State in allowing its territory, which it
has placed at the disposal of another State, to be used
23 See Rome Statute, supra note 17, at art. 5(2).
24 Definition of Aggression, G.A. Res. 3314(XXIX), annex, U.N. Doc. AIRES/29/
3314 (Dec. 14, 1974).
25 Id. at art. 1.
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by that other State for perpetrating an act of aggres-
sion against a third State;
(g) The sending by or on behalf of a State of armed
bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry
out acts of armed force against another State of such
gravity as to amount to the acts listed above, or its
substantial involvement therein.26
Pursuant to article 4, this is just an illustrative, not exhaustive, list
of prohibited acts. 27 Could dictatorship be criminalized under this defini-
tion of aggression?
The answer is, of course, an ambiguous yes and no. There are cer-
tainly many acts within the above list, as well as other acts that would fit
within the general definition of aggression in article 1, that a dictator would
have committed. The problem and the reason for the "no" answer is the
fact that to fit dictatorship within the definition of aggression would result
in an under-inclusion of crimes. Aggression is but one of the crimes a dic-
tator might commit and not one of the civil and political crimes we perhaps
most logically view dictators as committing. For this reason, aggression
alone could not support the criminalization of dictatorship.
B. The Crime of Genocide
Jurisdiction over genocide is granted to the Court pursuant to article
5(l)(a) of the Statute and defined in article 6:
For the purposes of this Statute, "genocide" means any of the fol-
lowing acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national,
ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of
the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life
calculated to bring about its physical destruction in
whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within
the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another
group. 28
26 Id. at art. 3.
27 Id. at art. 4.
28 Genocide Convention, supra note 4, at art. 6.
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The Genocide Convention was one of the first passed by the United
Nations after World War II, and represented understandable horror at the
atrocities committed by the Nazis during the War. As such, and with this
memory firmly in mind, genocide has traditionally been viewed as the most
horrendous crime in international law. It is specific in its reach and intent,
and this gives rise to the same problem as aggression when trying to
criminalize dictatorship within the above definition: there is a high degree
of under-inclusiveness. Dictators have often committed genocide, but this
again is only one aspect of what they do, even though it is perhaps the most
horrific.
Even if the problem of inclusivity weren't present, the international
community has been divided on the proper scope of the definition of geno-
cide. There are those that view the Holocaust as the only true genocide, 29
and then there are those that would expand the scope to include other mass
murders.30 For the definition of genocide to even approach adequacy in
criminalizing dictatorship, it would have to add a group identifiable as to
political orientation. Although the conviction of Jean-Paul Akayesu before
the Rwanda Tribunal31 for genocide points to the international community's
acceptance of a broader definition, to go even beyond that to try and include
the political classes that are most harmed by dictatorship might well test
what consensus has been built thus far.
With these two problems in mind, dictatorship could not be
criminalized under the existing definition of genocide.
29 See Michael J. Kelly, Can Sovereigns be Brought to Justice? The Crime of
Genocide's Evolution and the Meaning of the Milosevic Trial, 76 ST. JOHN'S L.
REV. 257, 279 (2002) (noting Steven T. Katz, The Uniqueness of the Holocaust:
The Historical Dimension, in Is THE HOLOCAUST UNIQUE?: PERSPECTIVES ON COM-
PARATIVE GENOCIDE (Alan S. Rosenbaum ed., 1996)).
30 See Kelly D. Askin, Stefan A. Riesenfeld Symposium 2002: Prosecuting War-
time Rape and Other Gender-Related Crimes under International Law: Extraordi-
nary Advances, Enduring Obstacles, 21 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 288, 317 (2003)
(noting the contribution of the I.C.T.R. in expanding the scope of the definition of
genocide); Alycia T. Feindel, Svmposium: Post-Conflict Justice: From Malmedy to
Halabja: Reconciling Sexual Orientation: Creating a Definition of Genocide that
Includes Sexual Orientation, 13 MSU-DCL J. INT'L L. 197 (2005) (arguing for the
inclusion of sexual orientation within the protected groups of the genocide defini-
tion); Rhona K.M. Smith, Conceiving the Lawyer as Creative Problem Solver: Spe-
cific Applications: The International Impact of Creative Problem Solving:
Resolving the Plight of Indigenous Peoples, 34 CAL. W. L. REv. 411 (1998)(argu-
ing that acts of cultural genocide should be included within the definition).
31 Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, §7.8
(Sept. 2, 1998).
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C. War Crimes
Jurisdiction over war crimes is granted by article 5(l)(c) of the Stat-
ute and defined in article 8. Although many acts are delineated within the
subsections of article 8, defined broadly "war crimes" fit into four main
categories: grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of August 12,
1949,32 "[o]ther serious violations of laws and customs applicable in inter-
national armed conflict, within the established framework of international
law, '33 "serious violations of article 3 common to the four Geneva Conven-
tions of 12 August 1949" in the case of an armed conflict not of an interna-
tional character, 34 and "other serious violations of the laws and customs
applicable in armed conflicts not of an international character" within the
established framework of international law. 35 The question then is, can dic-
tatorship be fit within the extensive list of war crimes contained within the
Rome Statute?
The answer, again, is no. This is for two reasons. First, from a
jurisdictional standpoint, including dictatorship as a war crime would ex-
clude the majority of a dictator's acts, and second, the acts enumerated
would again be under-inclusive concerning a dictator's possible crimes.
Jurisdictionally, the threshold requirement for a finding that a war
crime has been committed is that there was an actual war or some other sort
of armed conflict or hostile occupation. 36 This requirement of a nexus be-
tween the dictator's acts and other circumstances make it a certainty that in
most cases the gravest violations of rights by a dictator would escape re-
view. The political and civil violations committed by dictators are often
perpetrated in times of peace. With the need to prove this nexus, these acts
would not be deemed crimes. Even leaving aside this loophole, however,
there are no definitions within the list of acts that could entirely support the
crime of dictatorship. As with both genocide and aggression, war crimes
provide a list of acts that a dictator might well commit in the furtherance of
his regime, but this list is not exhaustive and does not cover those political
and civil violations that we most readily imagine a dictator would commit.
32 Rome Statute, supra note 17 at art. 8(2)(a).
33 Id. at art. 8(2)(b).
34 Id. at art. 8(2)(c).
35 Id. at art. 8(2)(e).
36 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, supra note 5, at art. 2; Geneva Convention for
the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of
Armed Forces at Sea, supra note 5, at art. 2; Geneva Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War, supra note 5, at art. 2; Geneva Convention Relative
to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, supra note 5, at art. 2.
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Taking into account both the jurisdictional limitation of war crimes and its
under-inclusivity concerning the acts that would need to be criminalized, it
is apparent that war crimes cannot serve as the way by which to criminalize
dictatorship.
D. Crimes Against Humanity
Jurisdiction over crimes against humanity is granted by article
5(l)(b) of the Statute and defined in article 7:
1. For the purpose of this Statute, "crime against humanity"
means any of the following acts when committed as part of
a widespread or systematic attack directed against any ci-
vilian population, with knowledge of the attack:
(a) Murder;
(b) Extermination;
(c) Enslavement;
(d) Deportation or forcible transfer of population;
(e) Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical
liberty in violation of fundamental rules of interna-
tional law;
(f) Torture;
(g) Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced
pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of
sexual violence of comparable gravity;
(h) Persecution against any identifiable group or collec-
tivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, re-
ligious, gender as defined in paragraph 3, or other
grounds that are universally recognized as impermis-
sible under international law, in connection with any
act referred to in this paragraph or any crime within
the jurisdiction of the Court;
(i) Enforced disappearances of persons;
(j) The crime of apartheid;
(k) Other inhumane acts of a similar character intention-
ally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body
or to mental or physical health. 37
Although this list is less extensive than war crimes, it offers a better
chance of criminalizing dictatorship. This is because along with its codifi-
37 Rome Statue, supra note 17, at art. 5(1)(b).
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cation of "typical" crimes, such as murder, extermination, and enslavement,
it also includes the crime of persecution and a catchall provision.
Persecution is defined as "the intentional and severe deprivation of
fundamental rights contrary to international law by reason of the identity of
the group or collectivity. ' 3 8 Although "fundamental rights" is not defined
within the Statute, it is likely the full breadth of civil and political rights
guaranteed by international law.39 The provisions of the ICCPR4° could
serve as a source of applicable rights. In this sense, then, the political and
civil crimes committed could be enforced against an individual, the dictator,
rather than simply against the "state." Importantly, and in distinction with
the definition of genocide, persecution applies to acts undertaken against an
identifiable political group. Thus, many of the violations that a dictator
could commit would conceivably fall within this definition of persecution.
Whatever crimes committed by a dictator fall outside the definition
of persecution could be caught by article 7(l)(k), which criminalizes "other
inhumane acts of a similar character[.]" This category has recently been
expanded by David Crane, chief prosecutor of the Special Court for Sierra
Leone, to include forced marriage and child abduction and recruitment as
crimes in all issued indictments. 41 Such inclusion could pick up any acts
not covered by persecution. It seems that used together, persecution and the
catchall provision could criminalize all acts of a dictator.
But, and this is a significant "but," just as there was a jurisdictional
limitation in war crimes, there is also a jurisdictional threshold necessary
for finding a crime against humanity. To qualify as a crime against human-
ity, the acts must be committed as part of a "widespread or systematic at-
tack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the
attack."42
This requirement is in the form of a disjunctive: the attacks must be
either widespread or systematic. They are defined as follows:
"widespread," as an element of crimes against humanity,
was defined in the Akayesu Judgment, as massive, fre-
38 Rome Statute, supra note 17, at art. 7(2)(g).
39 Eric S. Tars, Transition with Justice: How to Criminalize Dictatorship 12 (un-
published manuscript, on file with author).
40 See Int'l Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200(A), U.N.
GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
41 Angela Stephens, Forced Marriage Pursued as Crime in Sierra Leone Tribunal
Cases, THE GLOBAL POLICY FORUM, April 16, 2004, available at http://www.global
policy.org/intljustice/tribunals/sierra/2004/0416marriage.htm.
42 Rome Statute, supra note 17, at art. 7(1).
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quent, large scale action, carried out collectively with con-
siderable seriousness and directed against a multiplicity of
victims, whilst "systematic" was defined as thoroughly or-
ganised action, following a regular pattern on the basis of a
common policy and involving substantial public or private
resources. The Chamber... finds that it is not essential for
this policy to be adopted formally as a policy of a State.
There must, however, be some kind of preconceived plan
or policy. 4
3
"Attack directed against a civilian population" is defined in
the Rome Statute itself. It means a "course of conduct in-
volving the multiple commission of acts referred to in para-
graph 1 against any civilian population, pursuant to or in
furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit
such attack."44 An individual can be convicted of a crime
against humanity only if both of these elements have been
satisfied. In the case of a dictator, it is likely, although not
certain, that both will be fulfilled. There is no doubt that
most atrocities committed by dictators are perpetrated
against civilian populations. The bigger question may be
whether the attack was widespread or systematic. This re-
quirement will also be fulfilled in most cases. History is
replete with dictators whose activities have been both wide-
spread and systematic. But, history is not absolute in its
teachings, and there is the distinct possibility that a dictator
could commit serious crimes without them meeting the
"widespread or systematic" requirement.
Although crimes against humanity offers the best chance within ex-
isting international criminal law of criminalizing dictatorship, it is not the
best overall option. The crimes listed may have the potential to encompass
all acts of a dictator, though this is not a certainty. Importantly, the jurisdic-
tional requirements may leave some dictators beyond a court's reach.
Having canvassed existing international criminal law, dictatorship
cannot be fit neatly into any one crime. Aggression, genocide, and war
crimes offer both definitional and jurisdictional problems, while leaving un-
punished a great number of dictatorial acts. Crimes against humanity, while
41 Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3-T, Judgment, 69 (Dec. 6,
1999).
44 Rome Statute, supra note 17, at art. 7(2)(a).
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seemingly robust enough to encompass dictatorship, poses similar
problems, just on a much smaller scale. Although it may be possible to fit
dictatorship within the existing definition of crimes against humanity, a
convention on the subject is the superior route to take for two reasons.
First, definitive action is needed. This is, perhaps, an abstract con-
cept, but one with great symbolic potential. Dictators continue to rule abso-
lutely, even into the twenty-first century. 45 To add the crime as an
addendum onto existing international law is not the type of message that
should be sent. The message must be from an organized international com-
munity in the form of exact language, condemning unequivocally the type
of totalitarian abuses perpetrated by these types of governments. Rather
than leave the process up to enterprising prosecutors, such as David
Crane, 46 the international community itself must step in and definitively
declare dictatorship a crime.
Second, the nature of dictatorship requires a convention of its own
because of the particular problems inherent in defining and delineating both
dictatorship as such and the crimes that should be punished. As noted in
Part II, existing international criminal law does not concern itself with polit-
ical abuses. Absent the mention of "political" in the definition of persecu-
tion in article 7(1)(h) of the Rome Statute, there is no mention of civil or
political rights. Yet these are the very rights that are sacrificed by the popu-
lace under a dictator. To give dictatorship a convention of its own would
allow all the problems encountered above to be resolved in an unambiguous
manner. Definitions can be established, punishable acts stated, and jurisdic-
tion delineated. Through the convention process, a degree of certainty can
be gained that could not be attained through litigation in various interna-
tional or domestic tribunals.
With this goal in mind, I now turn to proposing draft articles that a
convention on dictatorship would require.
45 PALMER, supra note 21, at 189-239 (noting the existence of forty-five dictators
still in power, a number that was cut down to forty-four with the capture of Iraq's
Saddam Hussein).
46 This statement should not be seen as implying an opinion as to the activities of
Crane before the Sierra Leone Tribunal. My only thought is that for "dictatorship",
as opposed to "forced marriage" or "child abduction and recruitment," true intema-
tional action is needed. Both "forced marriage" and "child abduction and recruit-
ment" fit well within the existing definition of crimes against humanity.
"Dictatorship" does not. Hence, while Crane's actions regarding the reissuance of
the indictments with the inclusion of these other crimes is laudable, it is my belief
that to do so with "dictatorship" would be a misstep in the development of interna-
tional criminal law.
2008 THE CRIMINALIZATION OF DICTATORSHIP 27
III. DRAFT ARTICLES FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE
CRIME OF DICTATORSHIP
What follows is a proposal for the relevant substantive provisions
of a convention dealing with dictatorship. This section proceeds in six
parts, corresponding to the articles proposed. Those articles will deal with
the definition of dictatorship, the list of punishable offences, the need to
take effective measures to prevent dictatorship, the duty of states to
criminalize dictatorship domestically, the inapplicability of head of state
immunity as a defense, and jurisdictional principles dealing with the duty to
try or extradite an individual accused of dictatorship. Following each arti-
cle, I will identify and address potential concerns that the U.S. might have
with the proposed language.
A. Defining Dictatorship
Defining dictatorship would be perhaps the most important task
confronting those who would draft a convention, and also one of the most
difficult. Care must be taken in choosing the language so that there are no
problems of exclusion or inclusion: the definition must include all those that
would have culpability for their actions while excluding those that would
not. Dictator is defined as "one holding complete autocratic control ...
[and] ruling absolutely and often oppressively. ' 47 "Dictatorship" is defined
as "1: the office of dictator; 2: autocratic rule, control, or leadership; 3a: a
form of government in which absolute power is concentrated in a dictator or
a small clique, b: a government organization or group in which absolute
power is so concentrated, c: a despotic state. '48 Although these definitions
are familiar to us and have worth in everyday conversation, they alone can-
not serve to define dictatorship in an international convention. Greater
specificity is needed.
The definition of dictatorship must unite two strains of potential
abuses: those against political rights, on the one hand, and on the other,
those against civil liberties. Additionally, the definition must recognize the
dual reality of a dictatorship. It is a crime both by means and by result. A
dictatorship can be attained through an abuse of civil and political rights,
while a dictatorship "realized" would be characterized by disregard for
those same rights. The definition must take into account crimes committed
both in the means and the ends. The following definition joins the two
strains of potentially abused rights, takes into account the different stages at
47 Merriam-Webster Online, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/dictator
(last visited April 30, 2008).
48 Id.
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which these abuses may occur, and should meet the tests of inclusion and
exclusion:
Article 1:
1. The following characteristic acts, whether committed
by an individual or a group of individuals acting in
concert, when committed for purposes of attaining con-
trol in a government, or in a widespread or systematic
manner either in order to perpetuate authority previ-
ously attained or legitimate authority after it has been
attained, shall be deemed punishable offences:
(a) Use of state mechanisms to interfere with free and
fair elections to the advantage of the ruling party
or persons;
(b) Restrictions on the organization of political par-
ties or other civic associations in opposition to the
ruling party or persons;
(c) Lack of mechanisms to ensure the accountability
of ruling officials;
(d) Interference with the independence of the judici-
ary from the political branches;
(e) Use of state mechanisms to interfere with the
freedom of the press or freedom of expression to
the advantage of the ruling party or person;
(f) Governmental restraints on academic freedom and
the presence of political indoctrination, to the ad-
vantage of the ruling party or person, within the
educational system;
(g) Governmental restraints on the freedom of assem-
bly, demonstration, and public and/or private
discussion;
(h) Governmental regulation concerning issues of
personal autonomy, including rights to travel,
choice of residence and employment, the right to
organize for economic purposes, and the right to
be free from governmental terror, such as unjusti-
fied imprisonment, exile, torture, or substantial
overreaching by police or other governmental
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forces, in violation of fundamental rules of inter-
national law; 4
9
(i) Democide;50 and
(j) Persecution against any identifiable group or col-
lectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cul-
tural, religious, gender, or other grounds that are
universally recognized as impermissible under in-
ternational law, no matter what form the persecu-
tion takes.
The specified characteristic acts are broadly inclusive of those that
would be committed by a dictator. There is unlikely to be a dictator, in the
accepted sense of the word, who would be found not guilty under a conven-
tion with the above language. At the same time, the language is also ade-
quately exclusive. Although merely reading through the list it might seem
that a non-dictatorial government could at one time or another commit a
prohibited act, that act would not be in violation of international law so long
as it was an isolated incident. The prohibited acts must be either wide-
spread or systematic, insuring a minimal level of reprehensibility before a
leader could be found guilty under the proposed convention. If a party in a
democratic state committed one of the prohibited acts to attain governmen-
tal control, there is little doubt that that would be a violation of domestic
law, as it certainly would be in the United States; thus in those circum-
stances, where the act would be considered isolated, criminality would
merely be extended into the international sphere.
This definition should pose no problems to U.S. ratification. The
delineated acts encompass virtually every aspect of a dictatorship, while the
jurisdictional limitation of "widespread or systematic" will shield isolated
acts of legitimate governments from international or domestic criminal lia-
bility. This definition, at the very least, provides a working framework
49 TARS, supra note 33, at 15; See also FREEDOM IN THE WORLD 2003: SURVEY
METHODOLOGY, at http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2003/method
ology.htm.
50 This term was coined by political scientist R. J. Rummel in his book DEATH BY
GOVERNMENT (1994). Democide is the murder of any person or a people by a
government. This term includes genocide, as well as mass murders predicated on
other underlying reasons, most notably political orientation. Obviously the killing
of large segments of the population is something that a convention on dictatorship
should address. By using the term democide it is ensured that prosecutions may
take place outside the narrow definition of genocide that now exists. Most impor-
tantly, identity within a political group as a basis for murder or extermination
would be actionable under international law.
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from which debate can ensue. What is certain is that the United States
should not be concerned about the liability of its own government under
this definition. As a jurisdictional matter, it is almost beyond the realm of
possibility that the President, or a potentially larger group of officials, could
be successfully prosecuted as "dictators."
From a more practical point of view, this definition only prohibits
acts that would have already been deemed illegal under our Constitution.
Lack of accountability and the abuse of governmental mechanisms are ad-
dressed generally in the Constitution's articles on the legislative, executive,
and judicial branches, which strike an appropriate balance among all three
to ensure that lack of accountability and abuse will be the rare exception.
The more specific subsections of the definition dealing with concerns of
due process and civil liberties mirror similar ideals contained within our
Bill of Rights and other amendments. In any event, concerns with the pro-
posed language of the definition and list of prohibited acts could be cured
by a declaration or understanding stating that the U.S. views its obligations
under the proposed convention as consistent with existing domestic statutes,
jurisprudence, and constitutional principles. 51 Considering the extent of
protections afforded by that set of laws, it is clear the United States would
not be shirking any stricter class of international obligations. In short,
whether the U.S. would ratify the language as is or whether they would do
so with a declaration or understanding, it is certainly in a position, ideologi-
cally, to support the general principles contained within the proposed
definition.
51 This is a common practice undertaken by the United States. For instance, in
ratifying the Torture Convention, the Senate stated that the U.S.'s obligations under
article 16 extended only insofar as the term 'cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
or punishment' means the cruel, unusual and inhumane treatment or punishment
prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth, and/or Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution
of the United States (Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, Annex, U.N. GAOR, 39th
Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/5 1/Annex (1984)). The Senate made a
similar statement in relation to article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (Int'l Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200(A),
U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966)). Finally,
the Senate made reservations to the International Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Racial Discrimination based on existing statutory law, jurisprudence,
and basic constitutional principles (Int'l Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination, Jan. 4,1969, 660 U.N.T.S. 195).
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B. Aggravating Circumstances
As noted in Part II of the present article, a dictator will often com-
mit traditional international crimes during his rule.52 The larger purpose of
a convention is to ensure the political and civil crimes that a dictator com-
mits will be punishable offences. There should also be additional language
dealing with the linkages between a dictatorship and the commission of
traditional international crimes. If a dictator commits any of the present
international crimes, this should be taken into account as an aggravating
factor at the sentencing phase of any proceeding. The following language is
proposed for section 2 of the first article:
Article 1:
2. If an individual is otherwise qualified as a "dictator"
under the definition in Article 1(1), the following acts,
committed during the period in which the individual
was so qualified, should be deemed aggravating factors
entailing a commensurate increase in the gravity of
punishment:
(a) Genocide, as defined by article 6 of the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court;
(b) Crimes against Humanity, as defined by article 7
of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court;
(c) War Crimes, as defined by article 8 of the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court;
(d) Aggression, as presently defined by United
Nations General Assembly Resolution 3314
(XXIX).
These crimes represent the most horrific possible on the interna-
tional level, and their commission by any individual, no matter their posi-
tion in government, makes the qualifying term "reprehensible" seem trite.
Although it may not seem possible, these crimes nonetheless, when com-
mitted by totalitarian rulers and governments, are even more horrible, repre-
senting the worst aspects of humanity. When committed by a dictator,
these crimes evidence a total abrogation of the international rule of law, a
reckless disregard for the subject populace, and a flagrant abuse of the trust
and ethical obligation that should be the province of any ruler. As was
made clear in the introduction and Part II of this comment, dictators have
52 "Traditional" in this sense merely means those crimes over which the Interna-
tional Criminal Court already has jurisdiction.
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long committed just these types of crimes, and it is when those in absolute
power commit these crimes that the scope of devastation seems broadest.
Even though the specific purpose of a convention on dictatorship would be
to criminalize the dictatorial rule itself, the international community would
be remiss if it failed to address the most horrendous types of abuses perpe-
trated by these governments.
C. Preventative Legislation
One of the main points of criminalizing dictatorship is to punish
those who are found to be dictators. Yet the purpose must be to not only
punish after the act has been committed but to prevent dictatorship from
occurring in the first place. Although it may not be necessary in the major-
ity of cases, the proposed convention must have a preventative aspect to
achieve this objective. A preventative article takes into account the ability
of the executive, legislative and judicial departments of a given state to
ensure that certain acts may be prevented rather than merely punished after
their commission. The following language is based on the Torture
Convention: 53
Article 2:
1. Each State Party shall take effective legislative, admin-
istrative, judicial or other measures to prevent the
crime of "dictatorship" in any territory under its
jurisdiction.
2. No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a
state of war or a threat of war, internal political insta-
bility or any other public emergency, may be invoked
as a justification for dictatorial acts.
Section 2 tends to be more relevant for most states. Although it
may seem highly unlikely for a dictator to rise to power in a developed
democracy, such as the United States or the United Kingdom, in times of
emergency the executive is often given wide discretion in the temporary
suspension of certain civil or political liberties. 54 This section can be con-
strued as limiting the ability of the executive in such circumstances, ensur-
53 See Torture Convention, supra note 12, at art. 2.
54 See generally Harold C. Relyea, NATIONAL EMERGENCY POWERS, CRS REPORT
FOR CONGRESS (2001), at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/crs/
98-505-gov.pdf; S. REP. No. 93-549 (1973) (dealing with War and Emergency
Powers Act, prepared by the Special Committee on the Termination of the National
Emergency).
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ing that at all times their actions stay within the norms established by the
other articles of the proposed convention.
This article should pose no hurdle to U.S. ratification of the pro-
posed convention. Concerning similar language in the Torture Convention,
the U.S. registered no reservations, declarations, or understandings. Fur-
thermore, despite the potential latitude given to the executive in times of
trouble, the executive's power is still limited by the Constitution. The exec-
utive's power should never be as expansive so as to come within the pur-
view of the proposed dictatorship convention's list of characteristic acts. 55
That being said, the U.S. should also see this article as a necessity concern-
ing the wider goal of eradicating dictatorship throughout the world. Punish-
ing after the fact could become tedious and expend tremendous resources
that could be better used elsewhere. Prevention is one of the key ways to
avoid the problem in the first place. All considerations being taken into
account, the U.S. would undoubtedly be able to ratify the Convention with
this article contained within.
D. Domestic Criminalization of Dictatorship
One of the most effective ways of enforcing international norms is
by criminalizing those acts within domestic systems. This serves a twofold
purpose. First, the international instrument enunciating the norm is a collec-
tive statement of the community stating that the given act is criminal, and
second, by allowing domestic implementation and enforcement of these
norms, there is a greater chance that individuals will actually be prosecuted
for violations. Provisions in treaties and conventions mandating domestic
implementation of the subject matter of the respective instruments are com-
mon. The following proposed article is drafted with similar provisions in
the Torture Convention5 6 and the Genocide Convention 57 in mind:
Article 3:
1. Each State Party shall undertake to enact, in accor-
dance with their respective Constitutions, the necessary
legislation to insure that the act of "dictatorship" is an
offense under its criminal law.
15 For a contrary view, and a logical analysis of how an emergency could lead to
the executive exercising dictatorial powers within the confines of the Constitution,
see John W. Dean, Presidential Powers in Times of Emergency: Could Terrorism
Result in a Constitutional Dictatorship? FINDLAW, June 7, 2002, http://www.writ.
news.findlaw.com/dean/20020607.html.
56 Torture Convention, supra note 12, at art. 4.
17 Genocide Convention, supra note 4, at art. 5.
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2. Each State Party shall make this offense punishable by
appropriate penalties which take into account its grave
nature.
This article ensures that dictatorship is a crime not only in interna-
tional law, but also under domestic law. It will mandate appropriate penal-
ties under domestic law to enforce against potential offenders.
It is unlikely that the United States would have any objections to
this article. It ratified the Torture Convention aud Genocide Convention
without any reservations, declarations, or understandings concerning similar
language in those treaties. Furthermore, torture was already construed as
criminal under numerous U.S. domestic laws, while the U.S. also specifi-
cally implemented its international obligation in that context into domestic
law.5 8 The criminalization of dictatorship is consistent with our Constitu-
tion and it exemplifies the protection of some of the most fundamental ide-
als that we hold dear as Americans.59 Considering previous U.S. practice
with regards to ratifying human rights treaties, this article should be entirely
unobjectionable to any administration interested in undertaking a dictator-
ship convention.
E. Abrogation of Head of State Immunity as a Defense
Head of state immunity poses a particular challenge because a dic-
tator, by definition, is the head of state. Mechanisms must be in place to
counter the immunity that usually is conferred to those in that position to
58 The Torture Convention Implementation Act, 18 U.S.C. §§2340(A)-(B) (2000);
War Crimes Act of 1996, codified as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2000) (making it
a crime for U.S. servicemen to commit violations of the 1949 Geneva Conventions,
which includes the act of torture); Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000,
18 U.S.C. §§ 3261 - 3267 (2000) (allowing for federal prosecution of any civilian
accompanying U.S. armed forces abroad that commits a crime punishable by more
than one year in prison. This statute would allow for domestic prosecution of tor-
ture committed by U.S. personnel abroad); Torture Victim Prevention Act of 1991,
Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992); Uniform Code of Military Justice, Pub.
L. No. 81-506, 64 Stat. 107, arts. 77-134 (1950) (providing for court martial if
certain acts are committed by servicemen, including torture).
59 A dictatorship would certainly violate the fundamental principle of "separation
of powers" embodied within arts. I - III of the Constitution. Also, the acts commit-
ted by a dictator could also violate any number of more specific prohibitions con-
tained within the Constitution, including, but in no way limited to, the 1st, 3rd -
6th, 8th, 14th, 15th, 19th, and 24th amendments. Certain acts would also violate the
spirit of the Constitution as interpreted by the Supreme Court, most notably the
right to privacy embodied by the doctrine of substantive due process.
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prevent the proposed convention from becoming an empty gesture. Al-
though, it might be likely that head of state immunity would not be availa-
ble to a former head of state who had committed crimes in violation of
either international or domestic law, 60 there would still be no way to reach
those in power. Hence the need for a statement denying such immunity to
those who commit the crime of dictatorship. The following language is
modeled on similar provisions in the Rome Statute6 and the Genocide
Convention:62
Article 4:
1. This Convention shall apply equally to all persons
without any distinction based on official capacity. In
particular, official capacity as a Head of State or Gov-
ernment shall in no case exempt a person from criminal
responsibility under this Convention.
2. Immunities or special procedural rules which may at-
tach to the official capacity of a person, whether under
national or international law, shall not bar a Court or
Tribunal from exercising jurisdiction over such a
person.
Although this article will be necessary to make the proposed con-
vention effective, there are potentially two doctrines that, at least superfi-
cially, conflict with this language. The first is the Act of State Doctrine, a
common law principle largely left to the courts of the U.S. to resolve. The
second is the problem of discretionary grants of immunity offered by suc-
ceeding governments in the state where the dictator had held power as part
of an agreement to end his/her rule.
The Act of State Doctrine was first definitively enunciated in the
Supreme Court decision of Underhill v. Hernandez:
Every sovereign state is bound to respect the independence
of every other sovereign state, and the courts of one coun-
try will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of
another, done within its own territory. Redress of griev-
60 In re Doe, 860 F.2d 40, 44-46 (2d Cir. 1988) (finding that the Philippines had
waived immunity for former president Marcos and his wife); Republic of the Phil-
ippines v. Marcos, 806 F.2d 344, 360 (2d Cir. 1986) (finding that a former head of
state was not immune from suit on the basis of private acts); Islamic Republic of
Iran v. Pahlavi, 62 N.Y.2d 474, 477-78 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1108 (1985)
(New York court allowed actions to proceed against the deposed Shah of Iran).
61 See Rome Statute, supra note 17, at art. 27.
62 See Genocide Convention, supra note 4, at art. 4.
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F Provisions Dealing with Extradition and the Duty of States to Try
and Charge Individuals Excused of Dictatorship
Establishing the type of jurisdiction to be exercised under the pro-
posed convention, as well as any extradition procedures, is central to the
question of whether criminalizing dictatorship will be efficacious. If these
articles are too vague, it will be possible for dictators to escape punishment
even if they could be found guilty under the convention's provisions.
There are six bases of jurisdiction in international law: territorial,
nationality, protective principle, universal, passive personality, and the ef-
fects doctrine. Territorial jurisdiction allows a state to exercise jurisdiction
when a "person or thing is present in the territory of the state, other than
transitorily. '68 Nationality jurisdiction allows a state to exercise jurisdiction
over nationals of that state.69 The protective principle allows a state to exer-
cise jurisdiction over a person when acts are implicated that could jeopard-
ize that state's security or a limited class of other state interests. 70 Universal
jurisdiction "holds that a nation can prosecute offenses to which it has no
connection at all - the jurisdiction is based solely on the extraordinary hei-
nousness of the alleged conduct."' 71 Passive personality jurisdiction allows
the exercise of jurisdiction over a person who commits a crime against a
national of the exercising state (jurisdiction based on the victim.) 72 Finally,
the effects doctrine allows the exercise of jurisdiction when the "person,
whether natural or juridical, has carried on outside the state an activity hav-
ing a substantial, direct, and foreseeable effect within the state, but only in
respect of such activity. ' 73 International acceptance of these types of juris-
diction varies by state and which principle is being invoked.
For the purposes of the present proposal, the jurisdictional articles
of the Torture Convention should be used: 74
68 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, § 421(2)(a) (1987).
69 Id. § 421(2)(d).
70 Nathan A. Canestaro, "Small Wars" and the Law: Options for Prosecuting the
Insurgents in Iraq, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 73, 120 (2004).
71 Eugene Kontorovich, The Piracy Analogy: Modern Universal Jurisdiction's
Hollow Foundation, 45 HARV. INT'L L.J. 183 (2004).
72 Joshua Robinson, Note, United States Practice Penalizing International Ter-
rorists Needlessly Undercuts its Opposition to the Passive Personality Principle, 16
B.U. INT'L L.J. 487, 489 (1998).
73 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, § 421(2)(j) (1987).
74 Torture Convention, supra note 12, at arts. 5-7.
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Article 5:
1. Each State Party shall take such measures as may be
necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the offences
referred to in article 1 in the following cases:
(a) When the offences are committed in any territory
under its jurisdiction;
(b) When the alleged offender is a national of that
State;
(c) When the victim is a national of that State if that
State considers it appropriate.
2. Each State Party shall likewise take such measures as
may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over such
offences in cases where the alleged offender is present
in any territory under its jurisdiction and it does not
extradite him pursuant to article - to any of the States
mentioned in paragraph 1 of this article.
3. This Convention does not exclude any criminal juris-
diction exercised in accordance with internal law.
Article 6:
1. Upon being satisfied, after an examination of informa-
tion available to it, that the circumstances so warrant,
any State Party in whose territory a person alleged to
have committed any offence referred to in article 1 is
present shall take him into custody or take other legal
measures to ensure his presence. The custody and
other legal measures shall be as provided in the law of
that State but may be continued only for such time as is
necessary to enable any criminal or extradition pro-
ceedings to be instituted.
2. See Torture Convention, article 6(2).
3. See Torture Convention, article 6(3).
4. See Torture Convention, article 6(4).
Article 7:
1. The State Party in the territory under whose jurisdic-
tion a person alleged to have committed any offence
referred to in article 1 is found shall in the cases con-
templated in article 6, if it does not extradite him, sub-
mit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose
of prosecution.
2. See Torture Convention, article 7(2).
3. See Torture Convention, article 7(3).
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Article 5(1) breaks no new ground. Article 5(1)(a) is an application of terri-
torial jurisdiction, article 5(1)(b) is an application of nationality jurisdiction,
and article 5(1)(c) allows the discretionary use of the passive personality
principle. Also, article 6 is not a tremendously controversial article. It
merely makes clear certain procedural safeguards that must be offered an
individual taken into custody based on the commission of a prohibited act
or acts within the scope of the convention. Where this set of articles could
become controversial is in articles 5(2) and 7(1). These articles are viewed
as allowing for the exercise of universal jurisdiction,75 although the more
apt phrase would be quasi-universal jurisdiction based on aut dedere aut
judicare.76
Broadly stated, universal jurisdiction grants states the power to
prosecute and punish certain crimes without a specific link between the
crime and the prosecuting state. 77 International crimes have been deemed
so heinous by the international community that they are considered a crime
against the international community. Therefore any state has the ability to
prosecute them on behalf of the international community. At present, uni-
versal jurisdiction, in its most expansive sense, is confined to a limited
number of international crimes: "war crimes, crimes against humanity, ge-
nocide, and torture. ' '78 Even this limited application of universal jurisdic-
tion is not without its critics, 79 but it would seem that universal
jurisdiction's availability, in at least some cases, will be the natural evolu-
tionary end of international criminal law. 80
75 See Rachael E. Schwartz, "And Tomorrow?" The Torture Victim Protection
Act, 11 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 271, 285 (1994); Diane F. Orentlicher, Sympo-
sium: Politics by Other Means: The Law of the International Criminal Court, 32
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 489, 492 (1999); Michael Byers, The Law and Politics of the
Pinochet Case, 10 DuKE J. CoMP. & INT'L L. 415, 436 (2000); M. Cherif Bas-
siouni, Universal Jurisdiction for International Crimes: Historical Perspectives
and Contemporary Practice, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 81, 125 (2001).
76 "The duty to extradite or prosecute."
77 See Jodi Horowitz, Comment, Regina v. Bartle and the Commissioner of Police
for the Metropolis and Others Ex Parte Pinochet: Universal Jurisdiction and Sov-
ereign Immunity for Jus Cogens Violations, 23 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 489, 498
(1999).
78 See Chandra Lekha Sriram, Revolutions in Accountability: New Approaches to
Past Abuses, 19 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 301, 305 (2003).
79 Alfred P. Rubin, Universal Jurisdiction: Myths, Realities, and Prospects: Actio
Popularis, Jus Cogens and Offenses Erga Omnes?, 35 NEw ENG. L. REV. 265
(2001); See generally Kontorovich, supra note 66.
80 A very good, but controversial, example of this development can be seen at
work in Belgium. There, the "Loi relative a la repression des violations graves de
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There is no need to recapitulate here the debate concerning the le-
gitimacy of universal jurisdiction in international law, for this proposed
convention advances the lesser maxim of aut dedere aut judicare.8' Al-
though, closely related to the doctrine of universal jurisdiction, there are
important distinctions, most notably the fact that the "prosecute or extra-
dite" principle applies only if an individual is found in the territory of the
prosecuting state. A state would not be able, under the proposed conven-
tion, to prosecute individuals found outside the state, as would occur apply-
ing the more expansive universality principle. 82 This fact alone should
assuage, at least in part, fears of potentially arbitrary prosecutions of top
governmental figures. 83 The only obligation undertaken by states that are
party to the convention would be to prosecute an individual found within
their territory or to extradite him to a state that will prosecute.
Although the general antipathy of the U.S. towards the notion of
universal jurisdiction is well documented, conversely, the U.S. has under-
taken international obligations consistent with the maxim aut dedere aut
judicare. They are party to the Torture Convention, whose language is
identical to that offered above (in the substantive sense.) Further, in the
droit international humanitaire" (Law Pertaining to the Punishment of Grave Viola-
tions of International Law, June 16, 1993, amended Feb. 10, 1999) allows Belgium
to prosecute individuals accused of committing war crimes, crimes against human-
ity, and genocide, even if such individuals are not present in Belgium and the
crimes or individual lack any other connection to the state.
81 1 advance this jurisdictional basis on grounds of practicality only. It is a middle
ground between traditional bases of jurisdiction and universal jurisdiction; more
expansive than the former, but not as much so as the latter. From an ideal stand-
point, negotiators of a convention on dictatorship should begin with the notion of
universal jurisdiction. It should be the aim of countries to vigorously prosecute
these individuals, and such prosecution will be greatly aided by employing univer-
sal jurisdiction. As a convention will be a difficult prospect no matter what lan-
guage is used, those who wish to push the drafting of such a convention should
start with the most expansive language possible and then move on from there.
82 For an explication of the differences between the universality principle and aut
dedere aut judicare, see Gabriel Bottini, Universal Jurisdiction After the Creation
of the International Criminal Court, 36 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 503 (2004).
83 Under the Belgian law, for instance, numerous governmental figures have had
complaints filed against them. These figures include Augusto Pinochet, former
leaders of the Khmer Rouge, Laurent Kabila, former president of the Democratic
Republic of Congo, Driss Basri, former Moroccan Interior Minister, and Ariel
Sharon, prime minister of Israel when the indictment was issued. It is this expan-
sive view of jurisdiction that most countries have taken issue with, fueling the con-
troversy that surrounds the universality principle.
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statutory implementation of its obligations under the Convention, the U.S.
included the prosecutorial aspect of the above maxim. 84 Viewing both the
ideals that would drive the U.S. to ratify a dictatorship convention and the
governmental realities of our own republic, this article should cause no con-
troversy within a potential U.S. delegation. Ideally, the U.S. certainly will
want to have a broader mandate of jurisdiction than the rigid set of tradi-
tional norms, such as territoriality and nationality, so that dictators will have
no place to hide. If they are effectively placed beyond the jurisdiction of
the courts that would prosecute them, the act of criminalizing dictatorship
would be merely that, an act, utterly devoid of teeth. Realistically, the U.S.
should not worry about potential prosecutions. The proposed convention,
by definition, does not lend itself to "gray area" prosecutions. The line is
drawn fairly clearly and the hang-ups that the U.S. has exhibited towards
the I.C.C., largely predicated on the fear of prosecutions for the more amor-
phous definitions of crimes under that court's statute, are not present here.
Idealistically and realistically, the U.S. should have no problems endorsing
the jurisdictional reach of the proposed convention.
A potentially more serious problem concerns the ability of states to
have extradition requests granted for individuals accused of dictatorship.
The crime of dictatorship would be an inherently political act, and thus any
discussion of jurisdiction and extradition must address the political offense
exception. This exception prohibits the extradition of an individual accused
of a political offense or an offense of a political character.8 5 The rationale
for denying extradition in these circumstances "evolved both from benevo-
lent attitudes towards the underlying conduct of which the refugee was ac-
cused and concerns for the fairness of trial and punishment in the requesting
state. '8 6 Although potential due process concerns are easy enough to under-
stand, the sympathy to the refugee's conduct was the product of the com-
84 Torture Convention Implementation Act, supra note 53, at §2340A(b)(2)(There
is jurisdiction over the activity prohibited in subsection (a) if - . . . (2) the alleged
offender is present in the United States, irrespective of the nationality of the victim
or alleged offender).
85 Michelle N. Lewis, The Political-Offense Exception: Reconciling the Tension
Between Human Rights and International Public Order, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
585, 585 (1995); R. Stuart Phillips, The Political Offence Exception and Terrorism:
Its Place in the Current Extradition Scheme and Proposals for Its Future, 15 DICK.
J. INT'L L. 337, 340 (1997); Marsh Wellknown Yee, Hong Kong's Legal Obliga-
tion to Require a Fair Trial for Rendition, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1373, 1402 (2002).
86 Barbara Ann Banoff & Christopher H. Pyle, "To Surrender Political Offend-
ers ": The Political Offense Exception to Extradition in United States Law, 16
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 169, 180 (1984).
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plex and shifting political landscape of nineteenth century Europe. Broadly
stated, the "exception was created to protect political dissidents from judi-
cial retribution for their political activities,' 87 yet the exception is premised
on a far more nuanced view of competing ideologies. The U.S., along with
the other emerging nineteenth century democracies, "sought to protect the
unsuccessful revolutionary, who was presumed to be fighting for democ-
racy, from extradition for humanitarian reasons and out of self-interest."88
The exception was not conceived as a means by which to protect dissidents
of all persuasions, but solely as a way to protect democratic revolutionar-
ies. 89 Its aim was, and remains, to "protect those violent acts which are
necessary and corollary to political activity." 90
The realities of the modern world, most notably the advent of wide-
spread and systematic terrorism in the late 1970's and earlier 1980's, ex-
posed flaws in the exception as traditionally conceived. Terrorists, at times,
relied on the exception and not with misplaced hope. This fact exposed the
inherent tension within the exception: "the need for international public or-
der and the protection of individual human rights." 91 To combat use of the
exception by individuals whom it was clear that the exception had not been
intended to benefit in the first place, two strategies were used: specific cate-
gorization of the crime and exceptions to the exception. First, the political
offence exception has never truly been absolute in scope. From shortly
after its first appearance it was recognized that "the murder of a head of a
foreign government or the murder of his family shall not be considered as a
87 Phillips, supra note 80, at 340; See also Lloyd W. Grooms & Jane M. Samson,
International Law - The Political Offense Exception to Extradition: A 19th Century
British Standard in 20th Century American Courts, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1005,
1025 (1984) ("The political offense exception originated from a nineteenth-century
belief in the individual's right to agitate for political change, even through violent
means. Exempting political dissidents from extradition ensured that their freedom
from prosecution and punishment did not depend upon the success or failure of
their actions.").
88 Michael R. Littenberg, The Political Offense Exception: An Historical Analysis
and Model for the Future, 64 TUL. L. REV. 1196, 1196 (1990).
89 John Patrick Groarke, Revolutionaries Beware: The Erosion of the Political
Offense Exception Under the 1986 United States-United Kingdom Supplementary
Extradition Treaty, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1515, 1529 (1988).
90 Grooms & Samson, supra note 82, at 1009.
91 Lewis, supra note 80, at 589; See also Littenberg, supra note 83, at 359 ("At its
most basic level, the raison d'etre of extradition and the political offence exception
is to balance the right to dissent with the need to control crime.").
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is the 1986 United States-United Kingdom Supplementary Extradition
Treaty, which provides that the exception shall not be applicable for re-
quests between those two states. Although including either a specific
clause characterizing dictatorship as non-political for extradition purposes
or a general renouncement of the applicability of the exception to the crime
of dictatorship may be easiest, not even that much should be needed be-
cause of the nature of jurisdiction established by the treaty: jurisdiction
based on the principle of aut dedere aut judicare. If a state holds a person
accused of dictatorship, and dictatorship is viewed as a political offense
prohibiting extradition, the state will nonetheless still have an obligation
under international law to try him itself. Even if the requested state has
"reason to suspect that an unfair trial would result from extradition, it
should have no such doubts about its own courts. By subjecting these ac-
cused criminals to local prosecution a State can prevent the abuse of legiti-
mate political dissidents while simultaneously ensuring that criminals do
not go unpunished." 10 3
Finally, the practice of the U.S. in applying the exception strongly
suggests that even the characterization of dictatorship as a political offense
would not hinder its ratification of the proposed convention. The U.S. has
long evidenced a moral conviction that violent crimes should not go unpun-
ished, choosing to "extradite political offenders, regardless of the fact that
they may otherwise be protected by the political offense exception."'1°4 Al-
though the U.S. has liberally granted use of the exception to those who
attack totalitarian regimes, harkening back to the initial justification for the
exception, it has a "tendency not to grant the political offense exception to
offenders who attack democratic systems because of conflicting ideologies
such as anarchism or communism."105 Whatever critiques may be leveled
at this inconsistency, a deposed dictator would certainly fall within that cat-
egory of offenders whom the U.S. would gladly extradite, or failing extradi-
tion, try in domestic courts.
Whatever course is taken on this point, whether it be by an explicit
classification of dictatorship as a non-political crime, a blanket prohibition
on invoking the exception for an individual accused of dictatorship, or al-
lowing the realities of the jurisdictional system to alleviate the problem with
no overt action, the political offense exception should not pose a serious
103 Phillips, supra note 80, at 359.
104 Sarah L. Nagy, Political Offense Exceptions to United States Extradition Pol-
icy: Aut Dedere Aut Judicare (Either Extradite or Prosecute), 1 IND. INT'L &
COMP. L. REV. 109, 115 (1991).
105 Id. at 122.
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problem to the criminalization of dictatorship or U.S. ratification of a dicta-
torship convention.
Although the explicit purpose of this article has been to advocate
for the criminalization of dictatorship, lying implicit in such advocacy is the
right of democracy. Such a right does not truly exist in contemporary inter-
national human rights law, but the existing regime must consider itself fo-
cused on the recognition of such a right for two reasons. First, the rights
contained in the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, the ICCPR, the
ICESCR, and the various regional human rights instruments all look to the
fulfillment of democratic ideals by ensuring certain participatory rights in
governance, important civil and political freedoms, and negative directives
to governments to prohibit interference with such rights. It is certain that if
all these rights are complied with democracy must be the result. Second,
and circularly related to the first, only in a democratic form of government
may these rights be realized. Democracy is not one of the avenues by
which human rights may be protected and guaranteed; it is the necessary
condition to the realization of human rights. Without democracy and its
commitment to the individual citizen, the full breadth of rights guaranteed
by modern international law would be window-dressing, as it is for so many
in the nations of the world that still labor under the yolk of oppressive
dictatorial regimes. By criminalizing dictatorship two goals are thus
achieved. The perpetrators of some of the worst violations in the history of
the world can be punished for their crimes, and in that void left by their
ouster, democracy may enter and allow, for the first time, the enjoyment of
human rights by the formerly oppressed citizens. 106
IV. CONCLUSION
The U.S. would have, no doubt, legitimate misgivings in ratifying a
convention on dictatorship, many of which have been addressed above.
Considering the non-ratification of the Rome Statute and various other trea-
ties and conventions dealing with human rights, it would be a false hope to
view humanistic concerns compelling such ratification. Yet from a very
practical point of view, such ratification would serve the foreign policy
106 The belief that democracy will flourish once a totalitarian or autocratic ruler is
deposed is a contentious one, and one that has been dealt near fatal blows by the
U.S. experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan. Nonetheless, despite these setbacks, the
belief is still held and advanced in some form by many in the international commu-
nity, including the late Benazir Bhutto. See BENAZIR BHUTTO, RECONCILIATION:
ISLAM, DEMOCRACY, AND THE WEST (HarperCollins 2008).
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objectives of the U.S, Notwithstanding the fact that Saddam Hussein was
convicted by the Iraqi Special Tribunal, the U.S. is still being criticized in
the international community for invading Iraq in the first place. Had dicta-
torship been criminal at the time of that invasion, the rule of Hussein would
have been illegal under international law, thus providing a far more solid
foundation for action against him. Dictatorships around the world also pose
a serious national security risk, 10 7 while as well remaining economically
backward and largely unviable in the emerging global order. If it truly is a
goal of the U.S.to ensure democratic government for the peoples of the
world, 108 then criminalizing the type of autocratic and totalitarian rule typi-
fied by dictatorship would be a resounding international step in pursuance
of this lofty ideal. Whether the President and Senate could ever be com-
pelled to undertake the necessary process is a question that cannot be an-
swered until they are confronted with a concrete reality of a convention
outlawing dictatorship. Nonetheless, it is clear that such a proposed con-
107 ADVANCE DEMOCRACY ACT OF 2005, supra note 20, at § 602(2)(" The contin-
ued lack of democracy, freedom, and fundamental human rights in some countries
is inconsistent with the universal values on which the United States is based...
[and such] continued lack of democracy, freedom, and fundamental human rights
... also poses a [national] security threat to the United States, its interests, and its
friends, as it is in such countries that radicalism, extremism, and terrorism can
flourish.").
108 See, e.g., id. § 603. (Statement of Policy.: "It shall be the policy of the United
States- (1) to promote freedom and democracy in foreign countries as a funda-
mental component of United States foreign policy; (2) to affirm fundamental free-
doms and human rights in foreign countries and to condemn offenses against those
freedoms and rights as a fundamental component of United States foreign policy;
(3) to use all instruments of United States influence to support, promote, and
strengthen democratic principles, practices, and values in foreign countries, includ-
ing the rights to free, fair, and open elections, secret balloting, and universal suf-
frage; (4) to protect and promote fundamental ... freedoms and rights, including
the freedom[s] of association, of expression, of the press, and of religion, and the
right to own private property; (5) to protect and promote respect for and adherence
to the rule of law in foreign countries; (6) to provide appropriate support to organi-
zations, individuals, and movements located in nondemocratic countries that aspire
to live in freedom and establish full democracy in such countries; (7) to provide
political, economic, and other support to foreign countries that are willingly under-
taking a transition to democracy; (8) to commit United States foreign policy to the
• . challenge of [achieving] universal democracy; and (9) to strengthen alliances
and relationships with other democratic countries in order to better promote and
defend shared values and ideals.")
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vention would serve not only humanitarian interests, but political ones as
well.
In concluding, it is worth noting both what this comment has ac-
complished and what it has not. It has neither established absolutely defini-
tive language concerning the substance of the proposed articles, nor has it
exhaustively delineated the scope of acts that could, or should, be criminal-
ized. Much debate and compromise must take place before the articles of a
proposed convention on dictatorship would be acceptable to the interna-
tional community as a whole. Yet it is in the hope that such debate will
take place at the international level that this article may purport to have
accomplished something: a baseline from which this dialogue may proceed.
The draft articles proposed here provide a line from which states may move
towards a consensus on the relevant issues. Through this unassuming impe-
tus, perhaps in the not too distant future, the international community will
unequivocally state that dictatorship is a crime under international law.

